GORBACHEV and the STATE of the
SOVIET UNION in 1990
Gorbachev's prescription for the ills of the Soviet system was what he called perestroika (restructuring). The perestroika program was based on a now-or-never feeling that time was running out for the Soviet Union: it either had to make good on the promises of socialism or sink into the status of a disregarded third-class power. Perestroika's most dramatic component was glasnost (openness). Glasnost is related to the Russian word for "voice," and indeed the aim of glasnost was to give Soviet society back its voice -- in the expectation of hearing constructive criticism.
In politics, Gorbachev wanted a shift of emphasis from party to state--that is, a shift from a monopoly of power by an unelected vanguard party to legislative accountability and the rule of law. In foreign policy, he and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, became global spokesmen for "new thinking" that stressed interdependence and cooperation between nations rather than confrontation.
When Gorbachev set forth the outlines of this highly ambitious program, the first reaction, at home and abroad, was doubt that he was really serious. The early signs were not completely clear. In April 1986 the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl was compounded by secrecy and feeble attempts at a cover-up. The honor of glasnost was reclaimed, however, when Gorbachev used Chernobyl as a symbol of the sins of the old order and insisted on a policy of (almost) full disclosure. At the end of 1986, Gorbachev released Andrei Sakharov from his internal exile in the closed city of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod). Sakharov was a brilliant scientist who had become a dissident and a fearless protector of human rights during the Brezhnev era.
By 1988, there was no mistaking the reality of Gorbachev's reforms. Glasnost went ahead at full speed, revealing not only the crimes of the Stalin era, but also the full horrifying dimensions of the contemporary crisis. Gorbachev moved on with plans to create a genuinely effective national legislature. The new rules of political life were startlingly demonstrated when Yeltsin, returning to politics after his dismissal by Gorbachev in 1987, was elected to the legislature despite (or rather because of) the opposition of the party establishment. Sakharov and many other outspoken critics were also elected.
Gorbachev restored friendly relations with the West, disengaged the USSR from its war in Afghanistan, and ended its long-standing quarrel with China. In 1989 he renounced the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which had asserted the USSR's right to intervene militarily in Warsaw Pact countries. This quickly led to the fall of the Eastern European Communist regimes; Poland, Hungry, Czechoslovakia and in 1989, the German Democratic Republic with the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
But by 1990 ominous notes began to appear. One was that the economic reforms seemed stalled and economic performance had begun a long downslide. Also there were growing signs of loss of central control. Early in 1990 the Communist party's official monopoly of power was ended. While this move was hailed as a major step toward political pluralism, there was no political force ready to replace the party as a unifying element. This lead to the reactivating of long- dormant feelings of independence throughout the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Yeltsin's election (June 1990) as president of the Russian Federation made him the main opponent of central power. Gorbachev on the other hand became obsessed with preserving the union and suspicious of radical democrats who seemed to look forward to its disintegration. By the end of 1990 his shift to the right seemed pronounced enough to provoke Shevardnadze to resign as foreign minister while warning of a possible dictatorship.
It is in this atmosphere that we meet today, SEPTEMBER 16, 1990. It is drizzling in Moscow. It's rained for most of September, not unusual for the Fall. The asphalt underfoot in MANEZH SQUARE is slick with a thin coating of fine wet sand that, between rains, blows in from the countryside. The air is cool but not cold. Not for Moscow. This is a huge demonstration which has marched for hours from Puskin Square to Manezh. It is also one of the first real tests of the depth of perestroika with it's claims of popular democracy. It is organized in support of Gorbachev, and of Yeltsin, who are seen as committed to far-reaching economic and political reforms, but who are in need of massive shows of public support in order to defeat the more conservative elements within the regime.
THE SENSE OF POSSIBILITY IS PALPABLE IN THE CROWD,
SO IS THE SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY.
This article is adapted from Grolliers Multimedia Encyclopedia, the1997 edition.
PANORAMA VIEWING INSTRUCTIONS • HOME • EXIT • SITE DIRECTORY
GORBACHEV and the STATE of the
SOVIET UNION in 1990
Gorbachev's prescription for the ills of the Soviet system was what he called perestroika (restructuring). The perestroika program was based on a now-or-never feeling that time was running out for the Soviet Union: it either had to make good on the promises of socialism or sink into the status of a disregarded third-class power. Perestroika's most dramatic component was glasnost (openness). Glasnost is related to the Russian word for "voice," and indeed the aim of glasnost was to give Soviet society back its voice -- in the expectation of hearing constructive criticism.
When Gorbachev set forth the outlines of this highly ambitious program, the first reaction, at home and abroad, was doubt that he was really serious. The early signs were not completely clear. In April 1986 the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl was compounded by secrecy and feeble attempts at a cover-up. The honor of glasnost was reclaimed, however, when Gorbachev used Chernobyl as a symbol of the sins of the old order and insisted on a policy of (almost) full disclosure. At the end of 1986, Gorbachev released Andrei Sakharov from his internal exile in the closed city of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod). Sakharov was a brilliant scientist who had become a dissident and a fearless protector of human rights during the Brezhnev era.
By 1988, there was no mistaking the reality of Gorbachev's reforms. Glasnost went ahead at full speed, revealing not only the crimes of the Stalin era, but also the full horrifying dimensions of the contemporary crisis. Gorbachev moved on with plans to create a genuinely effective national legislature. The new rules of political life were startlingly demonstrated when Yeltsin, returning to politics after his dismissal by Gorbachev in 1987, was elected to the legislature despite (or rather because of) the opposition of the party establishment. Sakharov and many other outspoken critics were also elected.
Gorbachev restored friendly relations with the West, disengaged the USSR from its war in Afghanistan, and ended its long-standing quarrel with China. In 1989 he renounced the "Brezhnev Doctrine" which had asserted the USSR's right to intervene militarily in Warsaw Pact countries. This quickly led to the fall of the Eastern European Communist regimes; Poland, Hungry, Czechoslovakia and in 1989, the German Democratic Republic with the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
But by 1990 ominous notes began to appear. One was that the economic reforms seemed stalled and economic performance had begun a long downslide. Also there were growing signs of loss of central control. Early in 1990 the Communist party's official monopoly of power was ended. While this move was hailed as a major step toward political pluralism, there was no political force ready to replace the party as a unifying element. This lead to the reactivating of long- dormant feelings of independence throughout the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Yeltsin's election (June 1990) as president of the Russian Federation made him the main opponent of central power. Gorbachev on the other hand became obsessed with preserving the union and suspicious of radical democrats who seemed to look forward to its disintegration. By the end of 1990 his shift to the right seemed pronounced enough to provoke Shevardnadze to resign as foreign minister while warning of a possible dictatorship.
It is in this atmosphere that we meet today, SEPTEMBER 16, 1990. It is drizzling in Moscow. It's rained for most of September, not unusual for the Fall. The asphalt underfoot in MANEZH SQUARE is slick with a thin coating of fine wet sand that, between rains, blows in from the countryside. The air is cool but not cold. Not for Moscow. This is a huge demonstration which has marched for hours from Puskin Square to Manezh. It is also one of the first real tests of the depth of perestroika with it's claims of popular democracy. It is organized in support of Gorbachev, and of Yeltsin, who are seen as committed to far-reaching economic and political reforms, but who are in need of massive shows of public support in order to defeat the more conservative elements within the regime.
THE SENSE OF POSSIBILITY IS PALPABLE IN THE CROWD,
SO IS THE SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY.
This article is adapted from Grolliers Multimedia Encyclopedia, the1997 edition.
PANORAMA VIEWING INSTRUCTIONS • HOME • EXIT • SITE DIRECTORY